By Clay Shentrup
| #voters | Their Vote |
|---|---|
| 5 | A>B>C |
| 3 | A>C>B |
| 10 | C>A>B |
| 7 | B>A>C |
| 2 | C>B>A |
In this 27-voter election, A is both the IRV and the Condorcet winner. (Pairwise victories: A beats B 18-9; A beats C 15-12.)
If the C>B>A voters in the bottom row decide to "betray their favorite" C by voting B>C>A instead, then IRV elects B. (A is eliminated then B wins 14-to-13 over C). That, from the point of view of these voters, was an improvement, i.e. the favorite-betrayal worked.