by Forest W. Simmons (PhD)
Suppose that an election is being conducted under Range Voting and that you want to maximize the probability that your ballot will improve the outcome of the election, i.e. the probability that your ballot will be "positively pivotal."
If this is your goal, then your optimal strategy requires you to rate all of the candidates at the two extremes of the range.
At which extreme should candidate X be rated? To answer that question, first answer this one:
If X were to be tied for the highest average rating, would it be more likely for X to be tied with a worse candidate or with a better candidate?
If worse, then give X the maximum rating. If better, then give X the
minimum rating.
[Actually, this decision should really be based on expected utility,
but this point will not matter for our purposes.]
With this type of strategy the intermediate ratings are superfluous.
If all voters are planning to use this kind of strategy, then the ballot can be vastly simplified by using a twovalue range, say YES versus NO. Then we just have Approval Voting.
The trouble with Approval Voting is that optimal Approval strategies depend heavily on knowing the probabilities of wins and ties for the various candidates as in the strategy discussed above.
These probabilities are hard to estimate, and it's easy for evil corporate mediamasters to distort those estimates, thus biasing everybody's strategizing, thus biasing the voting, thus getting whomever they want elected, thus bypassing democracy.
What is the solution?
A variation of Approval called DYN (for "Delegable Yes/No"), which I will explain in Part II.
(Take a break.)
In part I above we had good and bad news for Range voters:
The simplest solution to this problem that doesn't compromise the "always give maximum support to favorite" advantage that Approval and Range share over the other common methods is a variant of Approval known as DYN, which stands for Delegable Yes/No:

Advantage: Unmanipulable by evil pollsters: The results available at stage 3 (e.g. proxy tallies, alreadydecided Yes/No tallies, relevant correlation coefficients, etc.) serve as a reliable statistical basis for candidates (with help from trusted technical advisers) to carry out their proxy obligations. They won't have to (or want to) rely on guessy poll results because with this information, they've got the ultimate truth. This will greatly mitigate (if not totally nullify) the effects of any disinformation spread by (official or unofficial) pollsters.
DYN can be viewed as a variant of approval voting. And as with plain approval, approving your favorite can never hurt.
DYN has another advantage over plain Approval and Range. By designating your favorite candidate to complete the Yes/No decisions that you are unsure about (and/or that you don't care about) you are able to express unique confidence in your favorite candidate above and beyond the other candidates that you have supported with a rating at the positive extreme.
That gives both moral support and extra decision power to your favorite candidate.
Even if your favorite candidate does not have sufficient support to be elected himself, there is a chance that the proxy power (to which you contributed) will give him enough political leverage to improve the outcome of the election over what it would have been otherwise.
This completes Part II of my explanation of the main rationale for the creation of DYN from the point of view of a Range/Approval fan. If you weren't a "Range/Approval fan" then read part III.
To take this to the general public, I would place more emphasis on the ease of DYN voting as compared to ranking the candidates. Yes/No is easy – and the fact you can "pass the buck" on any candidates you are unsure about, makes it even easier. Meanwhile, ranking every candidate in order, is not easy.
I'd also give more emphasis to the importance of the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC), which is failed by IRV, Condorcet (with or without rankingequalities permitted) Borda, etc.
(On the downside, a disadvantage of DYN is that it is more complicated to count than plain approval voting and hence can't be done with dumb voting machines.)
Why do we want a new voting method? So we can give maximum support to our favorite candidate without risking turning her into a "spoiler." Since simple methods that satisfy this FBC requirement are known, no complicated method that fails it can be acceptable.
Besides Range and Approval none of the wellknown methods satisfy FBC except a method called MMPO (MinMaxPairwiseOpposition) and certain versions of Bucklin, all of which require strategy similar to approval strategy, based on the same type of pollbased information. That leads to the same worries about evil mediamasters feeding us disinformation. So we are led inexorably back to DYN.
For IRV supporters who think that IRV comes close enough to satisfying the FBC (even though it doesn't), our best ammunition is in the form of YeeBolson diagrams. These diagrams, more than anything else, have convinced my Liberal Arts Math students that IRV is inferior to Approval and Condorcet methods, and not much of an improvement on Plurality for getting third parties into the running.
The only problem with YeeBolson diagrams is that students need a lot of interactive help in understanding how these diagrams work and exactly what they represent. Just showing them the pictures with the explanatory material from the websites is not enough.
Who can take the bull by the horns and get the truth into the hands of the movers and shakers?