Unintuitive examples where
approval-style range voting is not strategically optimal.
But these examples do not occur (i.e. the departure of the best approval-style vote
from optimality is negligible)
in large realistic elections in which 3-or-more-way lead-ties
(and near-ties) are regarded as negligibly unlikelier than 2-way lead-ties.
where dishonest approval-style range voting is strategically optimal.
But this cannot happen in 3-candidate elections, nor can the dishonesty
ever involve your favorite (or
your most-hated) candidate.
Also it in practice in 4- and 5-candidate elections seems rare and has small probabilistic
Theorem and proofs showing (essentially) that
no pure-rank-order-ballot voting system can obey both the favorite betrayal criterion
and immunity to candidate cloning. But range voting obeys both. More precisely, we give
numerous sets of criteria that range voting obeys but no
pure-rank-order-ballot voting system can obey.
In 2006 Balinski & Laraki proposed
a voting system very similar to range voting. But it is different because based on
medians not averaging. Here is a
Some simple voting optimality
pretty trivial and presumably previously known, although
I have not seen such clean statements before.
But I believe Bayesian Regret
is a better optimality measure than
any of these measures.
"participation failure" is forced in Condorcet methods
with at least 4 candidates.
An interesting and simple model of issues and voting
the YN model in which range votng performs optimally (with
while most rival voting methods can perform pessimally or near-pessimally badly.
Criticism of the voting-related work of mathematician Don Saari.