Same IRV 3-candidate paradox probabilities from different random number generator

QRSTUVWXYZElection ExampleREM Prob.Dirichlet Prob.Quas-1D Prob.
0000000000ABC= 0, ACB= 2, BAC= 0, BCA= 1, CAB= 0, CBA= 069.0764%82.6389%61.1113%
0001000000ABC= 0, ACB= 7, BAC=12, BCA= 0, CAB= 6, CBA= 06.3360%3.3758%11.3889%
0001000100ABC=15, ACB= 0, BAC=20, BCA= 0, CAB=10, CBA= 07.8076%2.7826%8.0555%
0001010100ABC=20, ACB= 0, BAC=16, BCA=14, CAB=15, CBA= 02.8818%0.9163%0.0000%
0101000000ABC=23, ACB=29, BAC=17, BCA=40, CAB= 6, CBA= 00.0164%0.0096%0.0000%
0101000100ABC=18, ACB= 0, BAC= 8, BCA=15, CAB=10, CBA= 01.5332%1.0079%0.0000%
0101010100ABC=26, ACB= 0, BAC=16, BCA=23, CAB=18, CBA= 00.1903%0.0675%0.0000%
1000000010ABC= 0, ACB=13, BAC= 0, BCA=12, CAB= 6, CBA= 00.0000%0.6970%6.9999%
1000001010ABC= 0, ACB=19, BAC= 0, BCA=18, CAB=12, CBA= 00.0000%0.1087%2.3750%
1000100010ABC= 0, ACB=25, BAC= 6, BCA=18, CAB=18, CBA= 00.7542%0.2211%0.0000%
1000101010ABC= 0, ACB=22, BAC= 0, BCA=21, CAB=16, CBA= 01.4849%0.8829%4.5138%
1001000010ABC= 0, ACB=13, BAC= 4, BCA=14, CAB=10, CBA= 00.0000%0.2796%1.3333%
1001001010ABC= 0, ACB=15, BAC= 0, BCA=20, CAB=10, CBA= 00.0000%0.0866%1.7917%
1001100010ABC= 0, ACB=13, BAC= 6, BCA=12, CAB=12, CBA= 00.5816%0.1912%0.0000%
1001101010ABC= 0, ACB=25, BAC= 0, BCA=30, CAB=20, CBA= 00.5637%0.4842%2.4306%
1010000000ABC= 6, ACB= 7, BAC= 0, BCA=12, CAB= 6, CBA= 00.0000%0.7006%0.0000%
1010000001ABC=13, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=12, CAB= 6, CBA= 00.0000%0.8732%0.0000%
1010001000ABC= 9, ACB=10, BAC= 0, BCA=18, CAB=12, CBA= 00.0000%0.0901%0.0000%
1010001001ABC=19, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=18, CAB=12, CBA= 00.0000%0.0938%0.0000%
1010100000ABC=12, ACB=13, BAC= 6, BCA=18, CAB=18, CBA= 01.3645%0.1487%0.0000%
1010100001ABC=25, ACB= 0, BAC= 6, BCA=18, CAB=11, CBA= 70.6750%0.1497%0.0000%
1010101000ABC=11, ACB=11, BAC= 0, BCA=21, CAB=16, CBA= 01.5123%0.5507%0.0000%
1010101001ABC=22, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=21, CAB=16, CBA= 00.6668%0.5181%0.0000%
1011000000ABC= 5, ACB=11, BAC= 3, BCA=18, CAB=10, CBA= 00.0000%0.4084%0.0000%
1011000100ABC= 8, ACB= 8, BAC= 3, BCA=18, CAB=10, CBA= 00.0000%0.3064%0.0000%
1011001000ABC= 5, ACB=12, BAC= 0, BCA=23, CAB=11, CBA= 00.0000%0.0677%0.0000%
1011001100ABC= 9, ACB= 8, BAC= 0, BCA=22, CAB=11, CBA= 00.0000%0.0990%0.0000%
1011010100ABC=10, ACB=10, BAC= 6, BCA=24, CAB=15, CBA= 00.0000%0.0672%0.0000%
1011011100ABC=10, ACB=10, BAC= 0, BCA=30, CAB=15, CBA= 00.0000%0.0618%0.0000%
1011100000ABC=11, ACB=17, BAC= 9, BCA=24, CAB=22, CBA= 00.5675%0.0468%0.0000%
1011100100ABC=14, ACB=14, BAC= 9, BCA=24, CAB=22, CBA= 00.9166%0.0898%0.0000%
1011101000ABC=11, ACB=17, BAC= 0, BCA=33, CAB=22, CBA= 00.1713%0.0848%0.0000%
1011101100ABC=14, ACB=14, BAC= 0, BCA=33, CAB=22, CBA= 00.3933%0.2041%0.0000%
1011110100ABC=15, ACB=15, BAC=11, BCA=29, CAB=25, CBA= 00.9354%0.1556%0.0000%
1011111100ABC=15, ACB=15, BAC= 0, BCA=40, CAB=25, CBA= 00.4667%0.3326%0.0000%
1111000101ABC=16, ACB= 0, BAC= 3, BCA=18, CAB=10, CBA= 00.0000%0.5566%0.0000%
1111001101ABC=17, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=22, CAB=11, CBA= 00.0000%0.0738%0.0000%
1111010101ABC=20, ACB= 0, BAC= 6, BCA=24, CAB=15, CBA= 00.0000%0.0823%0.0000%
1111011101ABC=20, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=30, CAB=15, CBA= 00.0000%0.0347%0.0000%
1111100101ABC=28, ACB= 0, BAC= 9, BCA=24, CAB=16, CBA= 60.4807%0.0665%0.0000%
1111101101ABC=28, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=33, CAB=22, CBA= 00.1528%0.1374%0.0000%
1111110101ABC=30, ACB= 0, BAC=11, BCA=29, CAB=20, CBA= 50.3003%0.0807%0.0000%
1111111101ABC=30, ACB= 0, BAC= 0, BCA=40, CAB=25, CBA= 00.1708%0.1689%0.0000%

Below is a smaller table of some of the most-requested pathology-probability information (All of the numbers in the below tables are derivable by adding up appropriate sets of numbers from the above master table):


PhenomenonREMDirichletQuas 1D
Participation failure W∪X20.6285%10.2593%19.1666%
Nonmonotonicity U∪V15.2304%5.7435%6.9444%
V: ("less is more" nonmonotonicity)4.9454%1.9676%0.0000%
U: ("more is less" nonmonotonicity)12.1583%4.5138%6.9444%
Y: Condorcet winner eliminated ("thwarted majority")3.3843%2.9514%19.4443%
Z: Reversal "winner=loser" failure2.4464%2.8356%0.0000%
R: All scoring rules agree B wins, but IRV says A wins (failure of "sniff test")2.8446%2.2859%0.0000%
W: Abstention failure: deleting A-bottom voters stops A from winning5.5827%4.0798%11.1111%
X: Would be strategic mistake for more voters of some single type to come16.2296%7.2917%8.0555%
T: Plurality and IRV winners differ24.4660%12.3264%24.9999%
S: Condorcet cycle8.7740%6.2500%0.0000%
Q∪R∪U∪V∪W∪X∪Y∪Z ("total paradox probability")24.5877%13.9854%27.4998%
Both kinds of participation failure simultaneously W∩X1.1837%1.1122%0.0000%
Both kinds of nonmonotonicity simultaneously U∩V1.8733%0.7379%0.0000%
Q∪V: Betraying B makes either B or C win (where either way the betrayers prefer that to A winning)15.2304%10.1852%19.4443%
Q: Loser drop-out paradox: If B drops out, that switches the winner from A to C. Also (which happens in exactly the same set of elections) "Favorite betrayal"; voters with favorite B, by betraying B, make C win (whom they prefer as the "lesser evil" over current winner A)12.1583%9.2014%19.4443%

And below is the same table, but restricted to elections in which the IRV process matters, i.e. in which the IRV and plain-plurality winners differ. (Warning: The error bars are approximately twice as wide as in the tables above.) This almost always makes pathologies substantially more likely:


PhenomenonREMDirichletQuas 1D
Participation failure W∪X69.3394%65.0222%49.1112%
Nonmonotonicity U∪V35.8572%26.5475%9.7224%
V: ("less is more" nonmonotonicity)20.2132%15.9624%0.0000%
U: ("more is less" nonmonotonicity)23.3006%16.5711%9.7224%
Y: Condorcet winner eliminated ("thwarted majority")4.6809%8.4505%22.2222%
Z: Reversal "winner=loser" failure4.5151%9.7418%0.0000%
R: All scoring rules agree B wins, but IRV says A wins (failure of "sniff test")11.6268%18.5445%0.0000%
W: Abstention failure: deleting A-bottom voters stops A from winning7.8425%14.8899%16.8891%
X: Would be strategic mistake for more voters of some single type to come66.3352%59.1548%32.2222%
T: Plurality and IRV winners differ100.0000%100.0000%100.0000%
S: Condorcet cycle18.6197%25.3522%0.0000%
Q∪R∪U∪V∪W∪X∪Y∪Z ("total paradox probability")74.1030%72.6134%54.4444%
Both kinds of participation failure simultaneously W∩X4.8383%9.0226%0.0000%
Both kinds of nonmonotonicity simultaneously U∩V7.6566%5.9860%0.0000%
Q∪V: Betraying B makes either B or C win (where either way the betrayers prefer that to A winning)35.8572%41.7838%22.2222%
Q: Loser drop-out paradox: If B drops out, that switches the winner from A to C. Also (which happens in exactly the same set of elections) "Favorite betrayal"; voters with favorite B, by betraying B, make C win (whom they prefer as the "lesser evil" over current winner A)23.3006%33.8027%22.2222%

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